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Abstract
We study the impact of nancial variables upon bankruptcy and
voluntary exit. Controlling for eciency, which we nd to decrease the
odds of both bankruptcy and voluntary exit, characteristics of rms
which correlate with the rms' access to funds, exert very dierent
impacts upon the two modes of exit.
Our ndings support the idea that information asymmetries create
cash constraints and that nancial decisions are used to signal rms'
quality and reduce the degree of information asymmetries between
borrowers and lenders.
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Firms may exit in dierent ways. Dierent ways of exiting are triggered
by dierent forces and may have remarkably dierent implications. Volun-
tary liquidations and bankruptcies are quite dierent in what concerns the
magnitude of the losses incurred and the identity of those that bear them.
Although exit is commonly associated with failure, this needs not to be so,
as the owners of exiting rms may have made a prot. Whether or not there
were losses, in liquidations debtors are paid in full. In contrast, bankruptcies
involve losses, at least for those creditors whose credits are left umpaid.
However, most empirical studies that have looked to the exit decision have
treated all exits alike. In one of the few exceptions to this rule, Schary (1991)
distinguished between bankruptcies, mergers, and voluntary exits, and de-
veloped empirical models to analyze these dierent means of exit. Having
observed 61 rms of which 43 have exited, she was unable to estimate sig-
nicant parameters to explain the dierent exit modes. In another study,
Harho, Stahl, and Woywode (1998) analyzed the competing risks of volun-
tary exit versus bankruptcy with a large sample of over 10,000 German rms.
The major strength of their sample is that it contained data on the legal form
of the rms, which enabled them to highlight the eect of limitation of lia-
bility upon the two dierent forms of exit. Apart from the legal form, their
sample also had data on the entrepreneurs for a subsample of rms; they
found that when entrepreneurs approach the retirement age, the likelihood
of voluntary exit increases while, this had no eect upon the probability of
bankruptcy.
While most economic theories assume that, in a reasonably competitive
environment, only ecient rms survive while inecient rms exit, rms may
also exit not because they are inecient, but because the owners lack the
funds to keep them going. If nancial markets were perfect, this would not
1happen, as rms would be able to borrow the cash they need. As potential
creditors do not have complete information on the rm's prospects, they may
deny funding to projects which are good (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), and good
rms may be forced to exit.
A number of empirical studies have discussed the impact of cash con-
straints on of rms' investment decisions (see Hubbard, 1998, for a survey).
A few studies analyzed the eect of nancial constraints on the decision to
become an entrepreneur (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen, 1994), on the
amount of capital available to the new rm (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989) and
on its role as shaping the size of new rms over time (Cabral and Mata,
2003), but little research has focused on its impact upon survival (but see
Cressy, 1996).
Indeed, there are only a few studies that have analyzed the eect of in-
debtness on the chances of survival. High levels of debt have been found
to be negatively related to survival by Zingales (1998), Baggs (2005) and
Heiss and Koke (2004). Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2004) also studied
this issue, but found no independent eect of leverage upon survival. Many
of the arguments about the relationship between leverage and survival that
permeate these studies suggest that the authors have bankruptcy in mind.
Empirically, however, they typically did not distinguish between voluntarily
and involuntarily exit. A plausible reason why authors did not discriminate
between exit modes is lack of appropriate data. The absence of such discrim-
ination would be innocuous if all exits (or the vast majority of them) would
be of the same type, or if they shared common determinants. None of these
assumptions is warranted, however.
In this paper, we distinguish between bankruptcies and voluntary exits
and analyze the eect that credit decisions exert upon these two dierent
modes of exit. We combine two unique datasets to create an even more
unique one. One of the datasets includes information on all rms employing
2paid labor in Portugal, while another one records all credit relationships
between nancial intermediaries and non-nancial rms. This allows us to
identify rms that cease to operate and to discriminate between those that
exit with losses for creditors from those that do not. Furthermore, because
we have data on all the lending relationships between rms and banks, we are
able to construct a very unique dataset, containing very detailed information
on the magnitudes and types of lending relationships on a comprehensive
set of rms. Our lending relationships are restricted to banks; we will not
discuss direct lending between the public and rms. We do not see this as
a disadvantage; on the one hand, Portugal { like most continental European
countries { is a bank based economy, in which stock and bond markets have
a rather limited scope. On the other hand, banks are more the kind of
monitoring lender which is portrayed in models than the general public.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the im-
plications of the theories regarding capital structure and lending relationships
for the two types of exit considered in this paper. Many of the existing mod-
els have opposite implications for bankruptcy and voluntary exit which have
not been previously contrasted. In section 3 we discuss our data sources
and measurement. Section 4 presents our basic results. Finally section 5
summarizes our ndings and concludes the paper.
2 Credit and the exit of rms
2.1 Debt
2.1.1 Debt as a means of alleviating problems of asymmetric in-
formation
One argument on how debt may alleviate information asymmetries between
rms and lenders is due to Ross (1977). The problem is that rms dier in
type (some are good, and some are bad), and while managers know which
3type is the rm, outsiders cannot tell which rms are good and which are
bad.
Managers can credibly communicate their rm's type to outsiders, by
choosing a compensation scheme in which managers make more money if the
rm is successful, but loose money if the rm goes bankrupt.
Firms whose managers choose high levels of debt confront increased prob-
abilities of going bankrupt. If its rm goes bankrupt the manager incurs big
losses, which is why only managers of high quality rms choose high debt
levels. These rms will confront high probabilities of going bankrupt but, as
they are good, they confront lower chances of exiting.
2.1.2 Incentive conicts between shareholders and debtholders
Debt can also create incentives on equity-owners to act dierently from the
interest of debt-holders. These incentive conicts have consequences for the
probability of exit and of bankruptcy.
Firstly, owners of highly indebted rms may pursue riskier strategies than
they would if the rms were less indebted. This is because when rms rely
largely on debt, stockholders get most of the earnings if projects are success-
ful, but debtholders bear the losses in case the rm goes bankrupt (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976). The consequence is that, if a rm is highly indebted,
it will take chances: it will either survive or go bankrupt. It will not exit
without imposing losses on creditors. A second possibility is that stockhold-
ers are paid out cash from the raised debt, thereby increasing the probability
that the rm is unable to meet its commitments (Myers, 2001).
The mere presence of debt may impair eciency within the rm, by
reducing the incentives for making eciency enhancing investments. Equity-
holders may refrain from contributing additional equity to the rm, as they
will bear the entire cost of this additional equity but not the benets if the
rms goes bankrupt in the meantime (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers,
41977; Jensen, 1986). This increases the chances that rms forgo protable
investments and put them in a less favorable position for surviving. This
should, in principle, apply both to bankruptcy and voluntary exit. However,
even if rms decided to leave voluntarily, their debts would not let them
avoid bankruptcy, and we should not expect a positive eect of debt of debt
on voluntary exit. Furthermore, the fact that the equityholders of highly in-
debted rms are doing business with the money of others creates an incentive
to try to postpone exit as much as they can and "play for time" in the words
of Myers (2001). They may not be able to control the decision of going into
bankruptcy but, to the extent that they have discretion on the decision to
voluntary exit, they will not exit.
2.1.3 Deep pockets and resisting competition
Indebted rms may also be more likely to go bankrupt, because debt invites
predation by rivals (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990). In order to reduce agency
problems, debtholders should call bankruptcy whenever the rm is unable to
meet its commitments. This makes highly leveraged rms less able to resist
adverse circumstances arising either from nature or from strategic behavior
by competitors (predation). However, while this does not aect the states of
nature, this makes indebted rms an easy prey for competitors and increases
the likelihood of predation.
2.1.4 The predictions of information and agency models of debt
By and large, the predictions of agency theory for the conicts between
equity holders and debtholders are consistent and are not dierent from those
from Ross (1977): debt increases bankruptcy and decreases voluntary exit.
This is fortunate, as we expect results to be clear, but will not allow us to
discriminate between competing explanations.
52.2 Debt maturity
Granting short term rather than long term credit may attenuate the asset
substitution problem, as it enables banks to monitor much more closely the
payment performance of rms (Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet, 1980; Ho and
Singer, 1982). With short term credit, the bank will be aware of nancial
problems as soon as they emerge and will have the option of claiming payment
of the principal before the situation deteriorates and greater losses become
inevitable.
If they are to grant long term credit, banks will take additional risks, and
will thus require a compensation in the form of higher interest rates. Firms
which have good private information about themselves will more likely choose
to get short term credit and run the risk of having to roll it over; those with
bad information will prefer to establish long term contracts and save on the
transaction costs required to rolling over the debt (Flannery, 1986). Thus,
Flannery (1986) predicts a positive relationship between debt maturity and
the quality of rms.
The same prediction emerges in a model by Diamond (1991). In this
model, however, the cost that rms incur in trying to roll over their short-
term debt, is that banks may not be willing to do it, and rms may go
bankrupt. As in Flannery's model, only rms which have good information
choose short-term debt. Unlike in Flannery's model, however, rms with
very high risk may not be given the option of getting long-term debt. Firms
with which end up with short-term debt, therefore, will be the best and the
worst rms, while long-term debt will be granted to intermediate rms.
Most empirical studies seem to support Diamond's prediction (Guedes
and Opler, 1996; Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Barclay and Smith Jr, 1995), but
Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, and Miller (2005) present contrary evidence.
Both Barclay and Smith Jr (1995) and Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, and
6Miller (2005) give support to the idea that rms with larger information
asymmetries issue more short-term debt.
Therefore, short-term debt should be positively associated with bankruptcy.
In what voluntary exit is concerned, the predictions of Flannery's model is
that short-term credit should be negatively related to exit, while in Dia-
mond's model the result will depend on the balance between good and bad
rms; if bad rms dominate, short-term credit should be positively associ-
ated with increased exit; if good rms dominate, short-term credit should be
negatively associated with exit.
2.3 Credit lines
Firms maintain credit lines as a backup for liquidity needs. By establishing a
credit line, the bank commits itself to lend at a predetermined interest rate, in
exchange for a fee paid by the rm on the commitment. Although an escape
clause, which is normal in this type of contracts, allows banks to renege on
their commitments, they will normally choose to honor the commitments due
to reputation considerations (Boot, Greenbaum, and Thakor, 1993)
Liquidity needs may emerge from adverse events, but also from prot
opportunities that need to be exploited on the spot. Credit lines may alleviate
the problem of excessive liquidation created by adverse events when rms
are nanced with short-term debt. Short-term debt leads to too frequent
bankruptcy because the rm may not be able to roll over its debt or will be
able to do it only at high interest rates. Insurance against this possibility
provided by short-term debt with a loan commitment for future funding
alleviates the problem (Houston and Venkataraman, 1996).
Credit lines also allow rms to take advantage of some investment op-
portunities that may require rms to dispose of funds faster than they can
get from nancial markets (Huberman, 1984). Firms possessing credit lines
should, therefore, be in better position to avoid bankruptcy and to take ad-
7vantage of protable opportunities and prosper.
The fact that rms have an unused credit line indicates that banks found
the rm to be trustable, as they committed themselves to grant credit. Firms
may, thus, choose to get credit lines also in order to signal to others their
quality and get better terms in other credit deals (Kanatas, 1987). On the
other hand, it also indicates that the rm is not credit constrained, as funds
are available and the rm decided not to use them. They should, therefore,
be are less likely to exit.
2.4 Number of creditors
In order to reduce information asymmetries, banks invest in obtaining in-
formation about the rms they lend money to. The more information they
get about rms they do business with, the better positioned they are to lend
money. Investments in information gathering are costly, and doing business
with several banks duplicates them. As banks pass these costs to rms in the
form of credit costs and availability (Petersen and Rajan, 1994) rms may
benet from developing close banking relationships with a single bank.
However, doing business with only one bank creates a potential hold-
up problem. If the rm has no alternative source of funds, banks may take
advantage of their monopoly position and charge higher interest rates. Firms
might, therefore, prefer to do business with several banks, as this reduces the
bargaining position of each one of them.
The choice of the number of banks to borrow from involves a trade-o
between duplicating the xed costs of providing information to lenders and
the benets from lower bargaining power from the part of banks. Firms
normally start doing business with a single bank and, as they grow older and
larger switch to multiple relationships (Farinha and Santos, 2002)
However, developing multiple relationships also has costs (other than the
xed cost of providing information), as approaching a new bank creates an
8adverse selection problem. Without previous private knowledge about the
rm, the new bank will not be able to tell whether the rm is approaching
it to escape from a rent extraction attempt, or because the original bank
is not willing to lend the extra funds due to his knowledge that the rm is
of a poor quality (Sharpe 1990, Rajan 1992). A good rm may therefore
be pooled with low quality rms and be oered inferior credit terms. This
should hold, at least for some time, before the new bank has the time to
develop rm specic knowledge.
If the hold-up argument holds true, rms with more than one bank rela-
tionship should have lower interest rates, thus lower costs. Increases in the
number of banks after a certain point should, however, increase costs. Af-
ter a certain point, the duplication of the xed costs of getting information
osets the benets of increased competition among lenders. Ceteris paribus,
we expect that, when the number of banks is small, increases in the number
of banks decrease the probability of exit. After a certain number of banks,
increases in this number should increase exit.
Distress exacerbates this problem and creates an additional one. When-
ever a rm goes into distress and asks for an extension of credit, banks will
be unsure whether this request has been previously rejected by another bank
with better information. Furthermore, multiple creditors make coordination
about potential recovery plans more dicult, and rms are more likely to go
bankrupt. Thus, the higher the number of banks the more likely it is that a
rm goes bankrupt.
2.5 Age of the rm
Over time, information is produced which is relevant to both the rm and
others. As time goes by and rms age, rms learn about their abilities, and
others (including banks) learn about them. Time may also bring changes in
behavior, either because of learning eects or because rms develop reputa-
9tional assets that they need to protect. All of these reasons have an impact
upon the likelihood of either voluntary exit or bankruptcy.
2.5.1 Learning about own eciency
Experience in the marketplace gradually reveals information to rms which
make them learn about their true level of eciency. Firms which nd out to
be ecient survive and grow, while those which are inecient exit (Jovanovic,
1982). The most inecient rms will have exited in the rst periods. Firms
that will have survived will be the most ecient rms, which will, therefore,
be less likely to exit in the future (Jovanovic, 1982). Because the sample will
have fewer and fewer bad rms, the average probability of exit will be de-
creasing over time, even if the individual chances of exit of each rm will not
vary over time, something which is known as spurious duration dependence.
2.5.2 Learning by doing
While the above argument rests on the idea that eciency of each rm is a
given, and time only revels this level to rms, time { through the accumula-
tion of production { also brings specic experience which may be relevant to
reduce costs.
2.5.3 Conveying information to others
Time also reduces the asymmetry of information between the rms and po-
tential creditors. Banks observe the payment record of rms over time and
will be more likely to be willing to lend money to rms that have a proven
track record.
On the one hand, even if banks do not observe anything substantive
about rms, only from observing that rms have survived, banks can infer
that "quality" of the rms; if the spurious duration dependence eect applies,
10they know that rms survived up to that moment are less likely to exit in
the future.
2.5.4 Shifting from risky to safer strategies
Finally, rms may shift to safer projects over time, in order to protect the
reputation they have developed in the meantime. Young rms, not having
a reputation to protect, will choose riskier projects which will only permit
payment of debts in case they are successful. After a number of periods pay-
ing its debts, a rm develops a reputation of being a good payer, and starts
enjoying more favorable credit terms. Old rms will choose safe projects in
order not to damage its reputation (Diamond, 1989).
3 The data
The data used in this paper come from two sources. The rst is the Quadros
de Pessoal survey, conducted by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment on
rms employing paid labor. The second is the Central de Responsabilidades
de Cr edito, which is managed by the Bank of Portugal, and which records
credit information for all non-nancial rms or individuals with a credit
relationship vis- a-vis the Portuguese nancial system. Both databases are
described below.
Quadros de Pessoal (QP) covers all rms employing paid labor in Por-
tugal and records data at the rm level, namely employment, sales, owner-
ship structure and industry codes, plus detailed information on every person
working at the rm, namely their employment status (whether they are wage
earners or owners of the rm, their wages (for wage earners), levels of edu-
cation, date of birth, date of the rst employment in the rm. The survey
has a longitudinal dimension, i.e., rms are identied by a unique number,
which allows individual rms to be followed over time.
11Table 1: Credit types, Bank of Portugal.
Credit type Description
1 Commercial liabilities
2 Financing liabilities at discount
3 Other short-term nancing liabilities
4 Medium- and long-term nancing liabilities
5 Other liabilities
6 Credit lines and other o-sheet liabilities
7 Overdue credit liabilities
8 Credit liabilities under litigation
9 Credit write-os (o-sheet)
10 Renegotiated credits
Central de Responsabilidades de Cr edito (CRC) includes data collected
by the Bank of Portugal from all nancial intermediaries legally operating
in Portugal. Its data includes information to the monthly credit balances of
all customers of each one of these institutions, discriminating credit balances
according to maturity and its repayment status (see table 1). The available
data includes the complete credit history of each non-nancial rm between
1995 and 2000. The two data sets could be matched using a unique legal
identier for rms, and thus we were able to track credit information for all
rms in the QP database.
We identied voluntary exits and bankruptcies using a two step proce-
dure, which combines the two data sources. In the rst step, we used QP to
identify exits. This was done by locating in QP the year when a particular
rm ceases to report to the survey. For the period we are analyzing, QP in-
cludes over 190,000 rms per year, and with such a large database, there are
inevitably some coding errors in the les. In identifying exits, we required
that a rm be absent from the survey for at least two years. Thus, for an
exit to be recorded in t, a rm has to be absent from QP in t + 1 and t + 2.
For this reason, in our subsequent analysis we use data only until 1998 (the
last year for which we can identify an exit), although our data les go until
12Table 2: Exits
Year Voluntary exit Bankruptcy Continuation Total sample
Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)
1996 9,984 (7.5) 1,536 (1.2) 121,290 (91.3) 132,774 (100.0)
1997 10,384 (7.5) 1,744 (1.3) 126,149 (91.2) 138,244 (100.0)
1998 13,124 (9.2) 2,066 (1.4) 127,309 (89.3) 142,466 (100.0)
Total 33,492 (8.1) 5,346 (1.3) 374,748 (90.6) 413,586 (100.0)
2000. Since a temporary exit may occur for a number of reasons other than
cessation of activity (for instance, due to late delivery of the questionnaire
by rms), we edited the status of rms that were absent from QP for one
year. That is, rms that were in QP in years t 1 and t+1 were considered
to be active in year t even if they were not actually in the le. The rm's
record was amended for that year, with all variables being imputed as simple
averages. For a few rms, the data on sales was missing, and the same pro-
cedure was followed to impute sales when a rm was present in QP in years
t   1, t and t + 1 but sales was recorded as zero in year t.
Bankruptcies were identied as those exits for which rms defaulted on
their debt obligations during the two years after exit was identied. CRC
includes two specic categories for defaults, namely \Overdue Credit Liabili-
ties", and \Credit Liabilities Under Litigation". Any exit occurring in year t
is considered \voluntary" if no default is recorded in t+1 and t+2. Likewise,
any exit in t for which defaulted amounts are recorded in t + 1 or t + 2 is
deemed \bankruptcy". Based on these denitions, we calculated the number
of exiting rms as displayed in table 2. Almost ten percent of rms exit, of
which roughly one fth are bankruptcies. These ratios are fairly constant in
the three years for which data is available.
CRC was also the source for the measures of the amounts and type of
credit, along with information about the lenders that concern us the most in
this study. From QP we computed measures of rm size, rm age, ownership
13structure and measures of the wages paid and the human capital at the
rm, that are used in the analysis to control for other dierences in forms
characteristics and that will be described later in this section. The data from
CRC is the following.
Total Debt Total debt is calculated by adding all on-balance sheet credit
types, which are types 1 through 10 except 6 and 9. The logarithm of one
plus the on-balance sheet amount (in euros) was used.
Short- and long-term debt We also computed the amount of short- and
long-term debt. Types 1 through 3 are explicitly short-term items, while
types 4 and 5 correspond to long-term debt. Impaired credit types 7 and 8
were imputed to short- and long-term debt proportionally. Credit type 10
was ignored. In order to include in our regressions rms without any short-
or long-term debt (or both), we used the logarithm of one plus the relevant
amount (in euros).
Credit lines The main component of o-balance items (type 6) are credit
lines. The logarithm of one plus the amount (in euros) was used.
Number of bank relationships The literature of banking relationships
has emphasized that cursory contact with a bank does not make a relation-
ship. In this context, it has been emphasized that the scope and in particular
the length of the contacts between rms and banks is important in providing
the bank with the information that makes relationships valuable. We we are
limited to counts of the number of banks with which rms have contacts,
as we do not have information on the length on the relationships. Although
we do not have information on the length of the relationship, we limited
the count of the number of banks rms borrow from to those they borrow
14Table 3: Credit variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Log of 1 + total debt 5.482 5.268
Log of 1 + short-run debt 4.926 5.149
Log of 1 + credit lines 1.981 4.088
Bank relationships 0.275 0.616
Note: sample size is 413,586 observations
long-term, to avoid counting as a borrowing relationship banks with which
rms may have only commercial paper operations. We used the information
on long-term debt to each lender to count the number of long-term bank
relationships. Multiple long-term loans with the same lender are counted as
a single bank relationship.
3.1 Controlling for Eciency
In order to control for eciency, a number of variables were computed from
QP.
Size and productivity Measure of size were included on dierent grounds.
First, if there are economies of scale, larger rms will have smaller average
costs. Second, scale should also be related to exit as larger units tend to
use technologies which are more capital intensive, and have small variable
costs. Conceptually, if there were not economies of scale total average costs
were identical, but rms' costs composition were dierent, those rms which
higher variable average costs would exit rst. Finally, size may be a conse-
quence of dierent managerial abilities. Firms are run by individuals, which
compare the income they can get from wage work with the rewards that can
be obtained from entrepreneurship. Individuals for which entrepreneurship
provides greater benets run rms, while the others work as wage earners
(Lucas, 1978). Those with greater abilities will be able to run larger rms.
Two measures of size were included: sales and employment. They both
15come from QP, and they may be regarded as alternative measures of size.
Simultaneous inclusion of both (in logarithms) will control for dierences in
productivity. The observed productivity is a direct measure of eciency.
Ceteris paribus, rms which are able to generate more value per employee,
will be more ecient and will be less likely to exit.
Wages and human capital Wages can also be seen as a proxy for pro-
ductivity. QP includes information on each worker at the rm. Wages and a
number of human capital variables were calculated from that part of the les.
Wages were calculated as the average monthly wage (in thousand euros) paid
to wage earners in each rm. Schooling was dened as the minimum number
of years required to obtain the highest degree reported to QP. Elementary
school corresponds to 6 years of schooling, secondary school to 12 years, and
an university degree to 17 years. The average wage earners was calculated
based on date of birth of each person and then averaged across individuals.
The same procedure as the one described for age was used to compute the
tenure of persons working at the rm, based on the date of admission at the
rm.
3.2 Age of rms
Firm age The age of rms was calculated from QP, by subtracting the
year of the rms' founding from current year. For those cases for which
information of date of creation was missing in QP, we used an auxiliary data
set (Tabelas Gerais database) available at Banco de Portugal, which contains
legal information on all existing and extinct rms in Portugal, including the
date of creation. The information of both datasets is highly consistent for
those rms which are present in both.
163.3 Ownership and ease of access to funds
One implication of the information asymmetry argument is that, as nan-
cial markets are unable to provide funding, rms which have better access
to internal funding will be in a better position to survive, in particular to
avoid bankruptcy. Two ownership indicators were included to control for
dierences in access to funds.
3.3.1 Number of active owners
More partners bring more money to the rm, and this should make rms
with a larger number of partners less likely to go bankrupt. More partners
may also have complementarities, which increase the chances of success of
rms. After a certain point, however, an increase in the number of active
partners creates coordination and free-rider problems, which may decrease
eciency.
As QP includes an indicator for the employment status of each person that
works at the rm (owner, wage-earner, and a residual class of unpaid family
member) a proxy for the number of partners in the rm can be calculated as
a count of the number of persons which has the owners status in QP.
3.3.2 Foreign Ownership
Foreign rms have access to a number of assets not available to domestic
rms; these include both capital, and intangible assets such as technology
and marketing knowledge. This should make them to be less cash constrained
and also more productive. Fewer liquidity constraints should make foreign
rms less likely to go bankrupt. Greater productivity should make them less
likely to exit. Controlling for productivity, however, they should be more
footloose and exit with greater probability than their domestic counterparts.
Foreign ownership was measured by a dummy variable which takes the
value 1 if the rm's equity is partially or fully owned be foreigners, and 0
17Table 4: Other summary statistics (Sample: 413,586 observations)
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Log of workers 1.476 1.103
Log of sales 13.481 1.551
Number of owners 0.612 0.862
Foreign ownership 0.011 0.106
Firm age 14.754 11.673
otherwise.
4 Results
We estimated a multinomial logit model for the risks of bankruptcy and vol-
untary exit with continuing rms as the reference category. All independent
variables are measured previously to the exit decision, so endogeneity prob-
lems are less of a concern. Many independent variables are in logs, therefore,
interactions between them are implicitly taken into account. The dependent
variables are positive if exit (voluntary or bankruptcy) occurs and zero if the
rms continues. Consequently, a positive coecient means that increases the
the corresponding variables increases the chances of exiting.
Table 5 displays the results of three estimations. Our basic specication
in columns (1) and (2) includes rms' debt plus second order polynomials in
the number of banks, the number of owners and rm age. It also includes
two measures of the size of rms (employment and sales), plus the dummy
variable that indicates whether the rm is owned by foreigners along with
industry and year dummies (not reported in the table). In addition to these
variables, the second specication also includes the magnitude of short-term
debts and the third the magnitude of the credit lines.
Before starting commenting on the results, it is worth spending a couple
of lines reminding our readers that, as we estimated the eects of many of
our independent variables in the form logX + logZ, we can retrieve the
18Table 5: Regression results: determinants of exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Volunt. Bankr. Volunt. Bankr. Volunt. Bankr.
Log(employment) -0.608a -0.549a -0.609a -0.565a -0.606a -0.542a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(sales) -0.132a -0.176a -0.133a -0.198a -0.128a -0.168a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(1 + total debt) -0.009a 0.256a -0.011b 0.160a -0.011a 0.162a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000)
Log(1 + sh.-run debt) 0.002 0.098a 0.003 0.102a
(0.649) (0.000) (0.463) (0.000)
Log(1 + credit lines) -0.009a -0.038a
(0.000) (0.000)
Bank relationships -0.239a 0.368a -0.236a 0.572a -0.231a 0.587a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank relationships2 0.030b -0.012 0.030b -0.050a 0.031b -0.049a
(0.018) (0.088) (0.022) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000)
Owners -0.220a -0.038 -0.221a -0.042 -0.222a -0.054
(0.000) (0.452) (0.000) (0.407) (0.000) (0.287)
Owners2 0.001 -0.060a 0.001 -0.058b 0.001 -0.054b
(0.959) (0.009) (0.958) (0.012) (0.934) (0.018)
Foreign ownership 0.677a -0.288 0.678a -0.260 0.690a -0.214
(0.000) (0.115) (0.000) (0.155) (0.000) (0.242)
Firm age -0.032a -0.055a -0.032a -0.056a -0.032a -0.056a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm age2 0.000a 0.001a 0.000a 0.001a 0.000a 0.001a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 413586 413586 413586
Note: estimation also includes industry and year dummies.
19eect of the ratio of X=Z from our estimates, by noting that the previous
expression can be written as log(X=Z) + (   )logZ. For example, if X
stands for sales and Z for employment,  measures the eect of productivity,
conditional on the independent eect of employment, which is estimated as
the dierence between the estimated coecient for employment  and the
one for sales . The sign of the dierence     will give us the sign of the
eect of employment, given the eect of productivity.
Therefore, taking into account the estimated coecients in Table 5, we
estimate that larger rms have lower probabilities both of exiting voluntarily
and of going bankrupt. This result holds for both our size measures (employ-
ment and sales), and it also holds when each one of this variables is omitted
(not reported in the table). Simultaneous inclusion of both variables allows
us to interpret the results as evidence of the eect of productivity (sales per
worker). The eect of sales per worker is given by the coecient of sales
in table 5, thus indicating that more productive rms have lower probabil-
ity of exiting and going bankrupt. As the coecient of employment is of a
larger magnitude than that of sales, our results indicate that, controlling for
productivity, rms which employ a larger number of persons have a lower
probability of exit. Overall, these results indicate that eciency matters for
survival and that it aects voluntary exit and bankruptcy very much in the
same manner. We move now to the eects of the credit variables.
The eect of debt is to increase bankruptcy and to decrease the prob-
ability of voluntary exit, as expected. We do not have measures of equity
or assets in our data, so we cannot compute the usual debt to equity or to
assets ratios. However, our data on rm sales, allow us to control for the rm
size and interpret our results as reecting the impact of debt over sales (the
inverse of the liquidity ratio), conditional on sales. The independent eect
of sales remains negative when we take into account the eect of debt over
sales (which is also negative).
20Our results also indicate that the larger the proportion of short-term
debt a rm holds, the more likely it is that it goes bankrupt. Note that the
independent eect of debt still holds as the coecient of debt is larger than
that of short-term debt. We were, however, unable to uncover a statistically
signicant eect of this variable upon voluntary exit.
Credit lines have a clear and similar eect upon bankruptcies and exit.
The larger the magnitude of unused credit lines, the less probable it is that
a rms exits (either voluntary or by bankruptcy).
The number of bank relationships shows the expected eects. More banks
decrease the probability of voluntary exit but only while rms borrow from
a small number of rms. Indeed, according to our estimates, rms that
deal with four or more banks see their their probability of exit increased.
More banks, on the other hand increase the likelihood of going bankrupt.
Although the rate at which this probability is decreasing, the maximum is
achieved when the number of banks is around 6 (the estimates in column 1
produce a maximum with 15 banks).
The results for the age of rms are also consistent with our predictions.
Young rms exhibit a signicantly higher probability of exit than their more
mature counterparts, while this probability decreases at decreasing rates. In
non-reported regressions, the eect of rm age was measured by a set of age
dummies. Interestingly, in both equations the eect of age is very similar.
The coecients of the age dummies are monotonically decreasing until the
age of ten and statistically dierent from the omitted class (rms with 50
years and more) up to the fth or sixth year, depending on the specication.
Easy access to internal funds seems to improve the chances of avoiding
bankruptcy. Firms with larger number of active owners and rms with foreign
owners are less likely to go bankrupt, although for foreign ownership the eect
is really not signicant. In the voluntary exit equation, foreign ownership
displays a positive coecient, consistent with a view that foreign rms are
21Table 6: Wages and human capital characteristics (Sample: 338,707 obser-
vations)
Variable Mean Std. Dev.




less attached to a country than their domestic counterparts. The results for
the number of owners indicate that more owners increase the probability of
survival. However, the quadratic term is never signicant in the voluntary
exit equation, thus giving little support to the congestion hypothesis.
4.1 Further controls for eciency
In Table 5 our controls for eciency include two measures of rm size, which
together can be taken as a measure of labor productivity. We do not have
information on earnings or prots but, except for very small rms in our
sample, we have data on the wages paid. Wages can be regarded as a proxy
for eciency if wages are, to some extent, the product of bargaining between
rms and workers. More productive or highly protable rms should be able
to pay higher wages. If workers are indeed able to get part of this prot,
high wages should be an indication of eciency.
In the estimations reported in Table 7 we included in our regressions
measure for the wages paid by rms. In columns (1) and (2), only the
level of wages paid is included in addition to the same variables that were
already included in table 5. The coecients associated to wages are always
and signicant on both equations, indicating that the most productive rms
confront lower chances of exiting, no matter the mode of exit considered. In
addition, the eect of other variables remains pretty stable.
Wages may dier between rms due to dierent compositions of the la-
22Table 7: Wages as measures of eciency
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Volunt. Bankr. Volunt. Bankr.
Log(employment) -0.560a -0.482a -0.558a -0.477a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(sales) -0.116a -0.157a -0.120a -0.158a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wage -0.146a -0.606a -0.172a -0.681a







Log(1 + total debt) -0.011b 0.156a -0.009 0.157a
(0.031) (0.000) (0.064) (0.000)
Log(1 + short-run debt) 0.002 0.102a 0.001 0.102a
(0.623) (0.000) (0.813) (0.000)
Log(1 + credit lines) -0.012a -0.037a -0.013a -0.039a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank relationships -0.215a 0.550a -0.216a 0.550a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank relationships2 0.023 -0.041a 0.021 -0.042a
(0.096) (0.000) (0.138) (0.000)
Owners -0.331a -0.128b -0.329a -0.130b
(0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.016)
Owners2 0.017a -0.036 0.017a -0.036
(0.000) (0.123) (0.000) (0.132)
Foreign ownership 0.724a -0.255 0.707a -0.287
(0.000) (0.228) (0.000) (0.182)
Firm age -0.033a -0.056a -0.029a -0.057a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm age2 0.000a 0.001a 0.000a 0.001a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 344108 338707
Note: estimation also includes industry and year dummies.
23bor force, namely due to dierent stocks of human capital. Accordingly, in
columns (3) and (4) wages are supplemented by three variables measuring
the stock of human capital at the rm: education, age and tenure, of these
variables being averages at the rm. These variables are included to control
for determinants of wages and we are not really interested in their eects.
Yet, we note that the estimated coecients have the same signs in both
equations. More importantly, neither the eect of wages nor the eect of
other variables are much aected by its inclusion. Moreover, the magnitude
of the Owners squared term is now quite larger (and statistically signicant).
Yet, the eect of owners is the voluntary exit equation is maximum when the
number of owners is 10, which still does not present evidence of congestion
eects.
4.2 More on bank relationships
In Table 5 we reported that rms that borrow from four or more banks have
their probability of exiting voluntarily increased, while the likelihood of going
bankrupt increases for increases in the number of banks (up to 6 banks).
These results are particularly interesting, given that they are obtained for
an European country. Many American studies concentrate on the dichotomy
between single and multiple relationships, on the assumption that as a sec-
ond supplier would be enough to reduce the hold-up problem Petersen and
Rajan (1994). In particular outside the U.S., (Ongena and Smith, 2000)
suggested that many rms may maintain more than two relationships and
(Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso, 2000) suggested that this pattern may be
due to rms seeking to avoid, not hold-up but refusal to lend due to banks'
internal problems. Our results suggest that, for more than four banks, this
may come at the expense of survival.
The measure of the number of bank relationships that we have been using
throughout the paper is a direct count of the number of banks with which
24Table 8: Bank relationships
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Volunt. Bankr. Volunt. Bankr.
Log(employment) -0.606a -0.534a -0.606a -0.544a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(sales) -0.128a -0.161a -0.128a -0.167a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(1 + total debt) -0.011b 0.159a -0.011b 0.163a
(0.014) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000)
Log(1 + short-run debt) 0.003 0.108a 0.003 0.102a
(0.549) (0.000) (0.483) (0.000)
Log(1 + credit lines) -0.010a -0.035a -0.009a -0.038a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank relationships -0.270a 0.726a -0.192a 0.670a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank relationships2 0.053 -0.069a 0.024 -0.061a
(0.146) (0.000) (0.077) (0.000)
Increased bank relationships -0.072b -0.178a
(0.031) (0.000)
Owners -0.221a -0.059 -0.222a -0.052
(0.000) (0.241) (0.000) (0.299)
Owners2 0.001 -0.053b 0.001 -0.055b
(0.942) (0.021) (0.936) (0.017)
Foreign ownership 0.691a -0.230 0.690a -0.215
(0.000) (0.208) (0.000) (0.239)
Firm age -0.032a -0.056a -0.032a -0.056a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Firm age2 0.000a 0.001a 0.000a 0.001a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 413596 413596
Note: estimation also includes industry and year dummies.
In columns (1) and (2) bank relationships are measured by the number
equivalent of banks implied by the Herndahl index of debt concentration.
25rms have a borrowing long term operation. Given that rms borrow from
a large number of banks, it is unlikely that all banks are have the same
importance to rms. It might be argued that the number of banks rm
borrow from is not the best measure for the number of bank relationships,
as some banks may be more important than others, in particular in contexts
in which rms borrow from many banks simultaneously.
In the rst two columns of Table 8, the number of bank relationships is not
a simple count, but takes into account the share of total debt borrowed from
each bank. In these columns the number of bank relationships is replaced by
the number equivalent of the Herndahl index of debt concentration. The
Herndahl index of concentration (H) is the sum of the squared shares of
the debt held by each bank, and 1/H corresponds to the number of banks
that would be required to produce the observed H, if the rm would borrow
equally from all banks. The results do not show major changes. Perhaps the
most noticeable change is that the increases in the number of banks are now
detrimental for survival for a number of banks greater than 2.5 rather than
3.7 as before.
In columns (3) and (4) the number of bank relationships is again the
number of banks with which rms have long-term borrowing operations. In
these columns, we also include the a dummy indicating whether or not a new
relationship was just initiated. The literature on banking relationships has
emphasized that relationships with banks are developed over time, and many
studies include the duration of the relationship as a proxy for its strength (e.g.
Berger and Udell, 1995). Farinha and Santos (2002) analyzed the decision of
Portuguese rms to switch from single bank to multiple bank relationships
and found that rms with poorer performance are more likely to make the
transition from single to multiple banks. They further found, that after
switching to multiple banks, rms are more likely to perform poorly and to
default on their obligations. In contrast to these ndings, our results suggest
26that an increase in the number of relationships decreases the probability of
exiting both voluntarily and by bankruptcy.
These results certainly deserve further investigation, but some tentative
explanations may be advanced: rms are subject to close scrutiny by banks
before the rst long-term loan, these rst loans are relatively unimportant in
magnitude and one year is insucient to observe rms defaulting on these
new long-term loans.
5 Conclusion
We analyzed the impact of nancial variables upon two modes of exit that
dier on who bears losses: in voluntary exit losses are beard by the equity-
holders only, while in bankruptcy debtholders share part of this burden.
Our results support the idea that eciency is a key driver of the sur-
vival of rms. Larger rms and those that are more productive have lower
probabilities of exiting voluntarily and of going bankrupt.
We also nd that the remaining determinants of exit, namely those re-
lated to the access of funds, dierent very widely between voluntarily exit
and bankruptcy. These ndings give very strong support to the idea that
rms are cash constrained, largely due to information asymmetries between
borrowers and lenders. Our ndings also support the idea that nancial
decisions are used to signal rms' quality and reduce the degree of infor-
mation asymmetries between borrowers and lenders. Highly leveraged rms
experience signicantly higher probabilities of going bankrupt, but are signif-
icantly less likely to exit voluntarily, a nding which is consistent with both
information and agency explanations. Intensive reliance on short-term debt
also increases bankruptcy, but we did not nd any signicant relationship
between short-term debt and voluntary exit. Credit lines are statistically re-
lated to the two types of exit, a nding which is consistent with information
27arguments.
We also found that borrowing from more banks lowers the likelihood of
voluntary exit, if the number of banks is small. However, for rms that
borrow from four banks or more, increases in the number of banks makes
voluntary exit more likely. Choosing the right number of banks involves a
trade-o between beneting from a lower monopoly power from the part of
lenders and having to pay for the extra costs of making a larger number of
lenders knowledgable about the rm. On the other hand, the likelihood of
going bankrupt increases if rms borrow from more banks, which is consistent
with more banks representing increased coordination costs in case of distress.
The nding that younger rms exhibit lower chances of exiting voluntar-
ily and of going bankrupt is consistent with information asymmetries and
with learning eects. Finally, we nd that rms that have more owners and
those that have foreign owners have signicantly lower probabilities of going
bankrupt, while the contrary is true for voluntary exit. Again, this supports
that notion that rms are cash constrained, as access to more abundant
sources of funds improves the chances of avoiding bankruptcy.
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